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Abstract. A computer simulation is used to study collective judgements
that an expert panel reaches on the basis of qualitative probability judge-
ments contributed by individual members. The simulated panel displays a
strong and robust crowd wisdom effect. The panel’s performance is better
when members contribute precise probability estimates instead of qualita-
tive judgements, but not by much. Surprisingly, it doesn’t always hurt for
panel members to interpret the probability expressions differently. Indeed,
coordinating their understandings can be much worse.
1 Introduction
It is well known that collective judgements can be better than individual
ones. Say you want to know how many jelly beans there are in a jar. Often
you will do better to take the average of your friends’ guesses rather than just
rely on your own judgement; some will guess too high, others too low, and
the errors will cancel out. Unless you’re a highly skilled jelly-bean estimator,
the average is likely to be more accurate than your own judgement, or that
of anyone else in the group. This effect is known as the wisdom of crowds or
collective wisdom (Surowiecki 2004, Page 2008).
The jelly beans are of course just a toy example. Collective wisdom has
been documented in many different tasks, from Francis Galton’s classic ex-
ample of guessing the weight of an ox at a county fair (Galton 1907) to
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forecasting geopolitical events (Mellers et al. 2014) and medical diagnosis
(Wolf et al. 2015). The kind of judgement varies from case to case (Lyon
and Pacuit 2014). In Galton’s example the individual inputs are point es-
timates (”The ox weighs 200 kg”). With geopolitical events they might be
subjective probabilities (“I’m 80% confident that the Democrats will win the
next election”); with medical diagnosis, categorical judgements (”This pa-
tient has Lyme disease”). The aggregation method also differs: you can take
the median of point estimates, the average of probabilities and a super majority
of diagnoses. Collective wisdom arises in many different contexts but just
how it arises varies from case to case (Lyon 2016).
This article is about collective wisdom in groups whose members express
themselves using scores and grades. These are coarse-grained expressions
such as the numerical scores 1 — 6 used by the Arts and Humanities Re-
search Council (AHRC) in Britain for evaluating research proposals. Other
examples are qualitative probability expressions such as probable, tossup and
unlikely, and the letter grades used in academic evaluation around the world.
Characteristically, scores and grades come with an ordering from “top” to
“bottom”: a 6 in the sense of the AHRC is better than a 5; a probable event is
more likely than an unlikely one; a C is a higher grade than an F, and so on.
Scoring and grading are common in juries, committees and panels. Nat-
urally they have attracted the attention of theorists of social choice. Much
work in this field has an “axiomatic” focus, being concerned with the for-
mal properties of various aggregation methods (List 2013). Accordingly, one
main goal of work on collective grading has been to characterize particular
methods for aggregating grades in terms of the axioms they satisfy (see for
instance Aleskerov et al. 2007, Gaertner and Xu 2012). Another goal has
been to improve on evaluation procedures currently in use by introducing
new and better aggregation methods. Thus Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki
(2007, 2011) propose the method of majority judgement, a generalization of
taking medians which they recommend not only to expert panels judging
wines and performance in sports and the arts, but also as a replacement for
traditional voting methods in political elections. The idea of grading candi-
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dates in elections is found also in the earlier idea of approval voting (Brams
and Fishburn 1978, Alcantud and Laruelle 2014). In a different line of en-
quiry, collective choice procedures are evaluated accordingly as they “track
the truth” about the worth of the alternatives under consideration, in some
choice-independent sense (Beisbart et al. 2005, Beisbart and Bovens 2007,
Beisbart and Hartmann 2010). Thus Marcus Pivato (2016) states conditions
under which approval voting, in particular, may be expected to maximize
utilitarian social welfare.
Wide ranging though it is, none of this literature on scoring and grading
in economics and political theory takes up the matter of collective wisdom,
and how its emergence depends on details of people’s interpretations of the
scores and grades in which they express their inputs. That is our topic here.
One prominent feature of natural languages is their contextuality: differ-
ent people interpret words differently, and the same people interpret them
differently on different occasions. Languages of scores and grades are to a
large extent continuous with natural languages, and they too are contextual.
We may expect that, as a result, groups of graders will often be semantically
diverse. That is, they will include people with different interpretations of the
grades. In the case of probability grades, in particular, great semantic diver-
sity has in fact been documented among doctors and their patients (Ohnishi
et al. 2002), members of a science panel (Wardekker et al. 2008) and students
of business and the social sciences (Figure 1, Wallsten et al. 1986, Morgan
2014).
Interpersonal differences in perspectives and cognitive style are known
to improve the judgement and decisions of groups (Surowiecki 2004, Page
2008, Tetlock 2005, Nielsen 2011). This epistemic diversity is not the same
thing as diversity in age, gender, cultural and linguistic background, or other
features that determine people’s social identities, but the two go together.
Epistemically and socially diverse groups will often also be semantically
diverse, though, and resulting misunderstandings might be expected to pull
in the opposite direction. Certainly there is support in the literature for
the idea that differences in people’s understanding of scores and grades
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less comfortable with such formulations. For
example, some years ago, my colleagues and
I conducted an expert elicitation among a
group of different types of health experts in
an effort to gain insight about health damages
that could result from chronic exposure to
submicron sulfate air pollution. One of our
experts, an inhalation toxicologist, tried re-
peatedly to answer our questions to provide a
subjective probability distribution on the slope
of a health damage function, but simply could
not bring himself to provide such answers. After
framing our questions in several different ways,
and always reaching an impasse, we suspended
the elicitation. Some days later the expert came
back to us saying he had been thinking about it,
that the questions we had been asking made
sense, and that he wanted to try again. However,
when we did that, he once again found that he
could not bring himself to make the necessary
quantitative judgments. Although this may be
an extreme case, I believe that it also reflects a
broader difference among fields.
Fifteen years ago, the Presidential/Congres-
sional Commission onRiskAssessment andRisk
Management (29), almost all of whose members
were medical professionals, argued that natural
scientists should provide probabilistic assess-
ments of exposures, and economists should
provide probabilistic assessments of damages,
but that health experts should provide only a
deterministic treatment of the health damage
functions associated with environmental expo-
sures. This reticence to engage in making quan-
titative subjective judgments has led some to
draw an overly sharp distinction between vari-
ability and uncertainty—with the claim that only
the former should be described in terms of
distributions (i.e., with histograms). Although
there are certainly situations in which it is
important to distinguish variability from un-
certainty, there are also many decision con-
texts in which distinguishing between the two
simply adds unnecessary complication.
Qualitative Uncertainty Words Are Not
Sufficient
There is clear evidence that without some
quantification, the use of qualitative words such
as “likely” and “unlikely” to describe uncertainty
can mask important, often critical, differences
between the views of different experts. The
problem arises because the same words can
mean very different things to different people, as
well as different things to the same person in
different contexts. Fig. 1 summarizes the range
of quantitative values that respondents attached
to various probability words, independent of
any specific context, in a study conducted by
Wallsten et al. (30). Wardekker et al. (31) re-
port similar findings in more recent studies
undertaken in The Netherlands to improve the
communication of uncertainty in results from
environmental assessments. Fig. 2 summarizes
the range of quantitative values that members
of the EPA Science Advisory Board attached to
probability words used to describe the likeli-
hood that a chemical agent is a human car-
cinogen. Such results make a compelling case
for at least some quantification when assessing
the value of uncertain coefficients or the like-
lihood of uncertain events. The climate assess-
ment community has taken this lesson seriously,
providing mappings of probability words into
quantitative values in most assessment reports
(34–36).
Cognitive Heuristics and Bias
We humans are not equipped with a competent
mental statistical processor. Rather, in making
judgments in the face of uncertainty, we un-
consciously use a variety of cognitive heuristics.
As a consequence, when asked to make prob-
abilistic judgments, either in a formal elicitation
or in any less formal setting, people’s judgments
are often biased. Two of the cognitive heuristics
that are most relevant to expert elicitation are
called “availability” and “anchoring and adjust-
ment.” These heuristics have been extensively
studied by Tversky and Kahneman (37, 38).
Through the operation of availability, people
assess the frequency of a class, or the probability
of an event, by the ease with which instances or
occurrences can be brought to mind. In per-
forming elicitation, the objective should be to
obtain an expert’s carefully considered judg-
ment based on a systematic consideration of all
relevant evidence. For this reason one should
take care to adopt strategies designed to help the
expert being interviewed to avoid overlooking
relevant evidence.
When presented with an estimation task, if
people start with a first value (i.e., an anchor)
and then adjust up and down from that
value, they typically do not adjust sufficiently.
Kahneman and Tversky call this second heu-
ristic “anchoring and adjustment” (37, 38). To
minimize the influence of this heuristic when
eliciting probability distributions, it is standard
procedure not to begin with questions that ask
about “best” or most probable values but rather
to first ask about extremes: “What is the highest
(lowest) value you can imagine for coefficient
X?” or “Please give me a value for coefficient X
for which you think there is only one chance in
100 that actual value could be larger (smaller).”
Having obtained an estimate of an upper
(lower) bound, it is then standard practice to
ask the expert to imagine that the uncertainty
about the coefficient’s value has been resolved
and the actual value has turned out to be 10%
or 15% larger (smaller) than the bound they
offered. We then ask the expert, “Can you offer
Fig. 1. The range of numerical probabilities that re-
spondents attached to qualitative probability words in the
absence of any specific context are shown. Note the very
wide ranges of probability that were associated with some
of these words. Figure redrawn from Wallsten et al. (30).
Fig. 2. Results obtained by Morgan (32) when mem-
bers of the Executive Committee of the EPA Science
Advisory Board were asked to assign numerical proba-
bilities to uncertainty words that had been proposed for
use with EPA cancer guidelines (33). Note that even in
this relatively small and expert group, the minimum
probability associated with the word “likely” spans 4
orders of magnitude, the maximum probability associ-
ated with the word “not likely” spans more than 5 orders
of magnitude, and there is an overlap of the probabilities
the different experts associated with the two words.
Morgan PNAS | May 20, 2014 | vol. 111 | no. 20 | 7177
PE
RS
PE
CT
IV
E
Figure 1: People ca me very different things by qualitative judgements
of probability such as probable, possible, and doubtful. (Figure from Wallsten
et al. 1986, redrawn by Morgan 2014.)
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must create trouble. Thus Douglas Hubbard and Dylan Evans (2010) cite
“variability of verbal labels” as a problem in qualitative assessment of risk.
Balinski and Laraki (2011) state as a requirement for using their method of
majority judgement that the members of the group must share a “common
language” of grades. Michael Morreau (2016) argues that interpersonal dif-
ferences in grading thresholds can make collective judgements “unsound,”
in a technical sense to be elaborated soon.
We consider the possibilities for collective wisdom in a quite common
kind of task: selecting the top k of some given n ordered items. A committee
or panel can approach this task as follows. First, each member grades each
of the items under consideration. The vocabulary of grades they use is fixed
in advance, but different members might interpret them differently. For each
item a collective grade is determined on the basis of the grades assigned to
it by all members of the group; then all of the items are ranked according
to their collectively assigned grades, and k items are chosen from the top of
the group’s ranking. The epistemic performance of the group — its capacity
to track the truth about which k to choose — is measured by calculating
how often, in a large number of trials, the k chosen events really are to be
found at the top of the actual ordering of the n items. In this way we can
study how features of grading languages and their interpretation by group
members— such as how many labels there are, and whether everyone has
the same understanding of them — affect epistemic performance.
Many factors may be expected to affect epistemic performance in addi-
tion to similarities and differences in members’ understandings of grades.
These include the size of the group and the individual expertise of its mem-
bers. To study the sometimes complex interactions between these and other
factors we approach our topic using, in addition to analytic methods, a com-
puter simulation.
Our findings are surprising. One main conclusion is that epistemic per-
formance can be very good even with a lot of semantic diversity. Indeed,
other relevant factors being equal, having a common interpretation of grade
expressions can seriously depress the performance of the group. Differences
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in understanding can under realistic conditions actually sharpen up the epis-
temic edge of groups.
There seem to be far-reaching consequences for the design and training
of juries, committees and expert panels throughout society. It might for
instance be counterproductive for members of a hiring committee to discuss
and agree among themselves, say, what it is for a candidate to be excellent, or
merely good or fair. Better for them to skip the coordination and work with
whatever diverse understandings they happen to bring to the group—better,
even, to increase semantic differences among members artificially, perhaps by
exploiting the familiar contextuality of scores and grades. These differences
tend to create disagreements that are, in part, verbal. Even so, they can help
the group to find out which of the candidates are better than which.
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we first discuss some of the main
features of grades that suit them well to individual and collective judgement.
Then we show how semantic diversity results in violations of Morreau’s
condition of soundness, but counter that this condition is much too strong
to impose as a general requirement on acceptable procedures for collective
grading. This prepares the ground for section 3, where we set up the model
of collective grading behind our simulation of risk panels. In section 4,
we present observations of the simulated panels. We comment as well on
the effects of varying certain parameters in the simulation, and on several
elaborations of the basic model. Section 5 sums up.
2 Pros and Cons of Grading
Allowing panel members to use qualitative language helps them to make
probability judgements that are both confident and timely. We often can-
not say exactly how probable events are. Sometimes that’s because relevant
information is unavailable, or because expertise is lacking, and sometimes
it’s just because there’s no time to find out. Even so, we might be able to
say that there’s a good chance of the one event occurring, while the other is
a tossup. The reason is that these qualitative expressions are coarse grained,
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each covering a range of precise probabilities. A panel member might be
reasonably confident that the probability of some event falls within a given
range though unable to come up with an exact number.
But qualitative language doesn’t only help individuals to make judge-
ments. It also enables groups of people to speak, as it were, with a single
voice. To see why, suppose that instead of eliciting qualitative judgements
we ask panel members simply to rank events by their probabilities. That
is another possibility when, for whatever reason, precise estimates cannot
be had. Then there is a well-known theoretical obstacle to aggregating the
several individual inputs into a single collective ranking. The Marquis of
Condorcet’s (1785) ”paradox of voting” tells us that, depending on what the
individual rankings happen to be, majority decisions about which events
are more probable than which cannot be relied on to produce an ordering of
all the events. Kenneth Arrow’s (1951) ”impossibility” theorem tells us that
the problem here is not some quirk of the particular aggregation method,
pairwise majority voting, since no procedure whatsoever for deriving a sin-
gle ”social” ranking from several individual rankings meets a short list of
seemingly mild conditions.
When group members grade things instead of ranking them, on the other
hand, there are different ways to proceed. Suppose for each item under con-
sideration we somehow gather together all the individually assigned grades
into a collective grade. Then a collective ranking of all the events can be read
off from their collective grades. There are different ways of determining the
collective grades. One is to take medians. The aggregation method used in
our simulated expert panel in section 3 is based on this idea, and Balinski
and Laraki’s “majority judgement” is a sophisticated elaboration of median
taking. So it is that grading enables groups of people to reach judgement,
first individually and then collectively.
That grading opens up possibilities that are unavailable when panel
members instead are invited to contribute weak orderings might seem sur-
prising. After all, assignments of grades correspond directly to weak or-
derings of the graded items. However, because the set of grades is finite
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and the same for all members of the panel, the weak orders arrived at by
grading are of a special sort: there is a limit to the number of equivalence
classes, the same one for all inputs. This amounts to a ”domain restriction”,
in the sense of social choice theory. In addition, the grades provide a way
of bringing into correspondence with one another the equivalence classes of
different people’s weak orderings. This means that there’s more information
in grades than in the weak orderings of Arrow’s framework.
Aggregating probability grades is under some special circumstances a
good way to get information about probabilities from the members of a
panel. When panel members have different interpretations of the applicable
expressions, though, it can be quite misleading. Collective judgements based
on the probability grades that panel members submit can fail to track the
private opinions on which those grades are based. Examples adapted from
Morreau (2016) illustrate.
Consider a panel of two experts that is to rank some given events by
their probability. The panel approaches its task as follows. First, each mem-
ber publicly assigns to each of the events under consideration one of three
available probability grades: good chance, tossup and unlikely.1 They do this
on the basis of precise individual estimates of the probabilities.2 Next, a col-
lective grade is determined for any given event using the following method
of splitting the difference. If both panel members assigned the same grade then
that is the collective grade of this event as well. If one member counted it a
good chance and the other an unlikely, its collective grade is the intermediate
tossup. Otherwise, the event receives one of two special grades reserved for
compromising. These are g · t, intermediate between good chance and tossup,
and t · u, between tossup and unlikely. Whenever one grader says good chance
and the other tossup the collective grade is g · t; tossup and unlikely come to
t · u. Finally, the panel’s ranking  is read off from the collective grades:
x  y if the collective grade of x is at least that of y, perhaps better.  is
1It’s simpler with just three grades but this example generalizes naturally to any other
finite number.
2Assume for the sake of the example that these are not public, perhaps because they are
not even consciously accessible to the panel members themselves.
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a collective ranking based on the panel members’ public descriptions of the
events in qualitative terms.
Additionally, let x ≥ y mean that the average of the individual graders’
precise estimates of the probability of x is at least as great as the average of
their estimates for y. This second relation ≥ compares events by how prob-
able the panel members collectively think the events are, by some reckoning
that gives equal weight to their opinions.
Finding out what the panel members think was the point of eliciting the
grades from them. So, it is to be hoped that the ranking , determined from
the elicited grades by splitting the difference, is true to x ≥ y, which tracks
what the panel members actually think. What’s wanted, more precisely, is
that for any x and y:
If x  y then x > y.3
Morreau (2016) introduces a technical notion of soundness as a criterion
for evaluating grade-aggregation rules. Intuitively, a rule is sound if rank-
ings determined on the basis of collectively assigned grades must always
agree with the result of aggregating the underlying estimates of the individ-
ual graders. We can be sure that x > y whenever x  y if the method of
splitting the difference is sound with respect to averaging precise probability
estimates.4
Our first example shows that aggregating grades can indeed be a reliable
way to get at what the panel members think. Suppose both members share
the following interpretation of the applicable probability expressions. The
common threshold for good chance is 0.8, on the probability scale 0− 1. That
is, each grader counts an event as a good chance if he thinks its probability is
greater than 0.8. An event counts as a tossup if its probability is greater than
3Here, x  y just means that x  y but not y  x; > is defined similarly in terms of ≥.
Notice that we should not hope that, in addition, whenever x > y also x  y. The reason is
just that grades are coarse-grained. For instance, two events x and y can receive the grade
unlikely, both individually and collectively, even though both panel members think that one
of them, say x, is a little more likely than the other. In this case x > y but not x  y.
4Compare Morreau (2016), Definition 10 clause (b).
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0.4 but no greater than 0.6, and an unlikely event, as far as the two graders
are concerned, is one whose probability is up to 0.2.5
With this common interpretation of the applicable probability expres-
sions, if x  y then x > y. To see that it is so, suppose x  y. That
is, suppose x’s collective grade is higher than y’s. Say x has a collective
g · t and y a collective tossup (the reasoning is similar for any other pairs
of grades resulting in x  y so we consider only this case). Inspection of
the aggregation procedure tells us that one panel member counted x a good
chance and the other a tossup. Also, either both members counted y a tossup,
or else one of them counted y a good chance and the other an unlikely. Given
the common interpretation of the three grades, the collective estimate of the
probability of x is the average of some number above 0.8 and another above
0.4. It has to be above 0.6. The collective probability estimate for y on the
other hand is either the average of two numbers no greater than 0.6, or else
the average of one number no greater than 1.0 and another no greater than
0.2. Either way, it can’t be above 0.6. Whatever the numbers happen exactly
to be, then, x > y.
The next example shows how semantic diversity can result in unsound-
ness.
For realism, suppose the events in question are threats. Mr. Queasy has a
low tolerance for these. His threshold for saying there’s a good chance of any
given threat materializing is just 0.35. (”Better safe than sorry!”) Ms. Breezy
on the other hand has a much higher threshold: for her, a good chance means
the probability is at least 0.6. An event counts as unlikely all the way up to
probability 0.38, as far as she is concerned. (”Chill, monkey buddy!”) Now
Queasy thinks the probabilities of some particular threats, call them x and
y, are around 0.36 and 0.62 respectively. His input to the panel is therefore
that there is a good chance of each. Breezy for her part privately puts them
around 0.61 and 0.37 respectively. While agreeing with Queasy that there is
5We assume that, in the nature of the particular case, the panel will be able to make
do with just these three grades—say because it is expected apriori that the events under
consideration fall into one of these categories.
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x y
Queasy 0.36, good
chance
0.62, good
chance
Breezy 0.61, good
chance
0.37, un-
likely
a good chance of x, she says y is unlikely. Aggregating as before, x’s two good
chance’s come to a collective good chance, while y’s good chance and an unlikely
come to a collective tossup, so: x  y. Averaging the individual probability
estimations, though, it’s just the other way around: y > x.
This example shows that when there is semantic diversity within a group,
collective qualitative judgements can misrepresent what the members really
think. That surely must tend to defeat an important purpose of evaluating
in groups: getting better judgements by pooling input from people with
different perspectives. Notice that the two estimates of y’s probability (0.37
and 0.62) dominate those of x (0.36 and 0.61). Arguably Queasy and Breezy
collectively count y more probable than x on any way of reckoning their
collective estimation that treats them as equals—not just averaging, as in
the example. Notice, also, that interpretations as radically different as theirs
are not unusual and have been documented even within groups that are
semantically and culturally quite homogeneous. We adapted Queasy and
Breezy’s interpretations of good chance and unlikely from Figure 1.
Morreau (2016) studies the semantic diversity through the lens of social
choice theory, by extending Arrow’s (1951) framework to collective grading
problems. When there is extreme uncertainty about the extent of semantic
diversity, he shows, collective grading is, in a precise sense, vacuous: under
seemingly mild conditions it cannot be counted on to track the members’
collective opinion on any acceptable way of reckoning this at all, whether
averaging or any other. Morreau makes this point by showing that while
collective grading can meet analogues of all conditions of Arrow’s ”impos-
sibility” theorem, when too little is known about people’s interpretations it
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is not possible to meet in addition to them a further condition of soundness.
The example of Queasy and Breezy is a case in which the grade aggrega-
tion procedure of section 2 is not sound, in Morreau’s sense, with respect to
averaging individual estimates.
But Morreau’s soundness requirement is very demanding. Often it will
not be critical to make the very best possible use of information distributed
among panel members. It’s important to do a good job when evaluating
project proposals for instance, but not at all costs. In the remainder we
impose no requirement of soundness. Grading thresholds will be allowed
to vary among different members of the group, even quite radically, so mis-
matches like the one we saw with Queasy and Breezy will occur. They might
depress epistemic performance to some extent but, provided they are not too
common, perhaps not very much. To see what sort of performance may be
expected from semantically diverse panels we turn now from the analytic
method familiar from social-choice theory to a different approach, and one
that has proven useful for studying complex social phenomena: computer
simulation.
The next section introduces a model of an expert panel whose task is
to select the most probable k of n events. Section 4 reports observations
of the simulated panel under different settings of parameters that may be
expected to affect its performance. These include, crucially, the extent of
semantic diversity in the group.
3 The Model and Simulation
We model an expert panel with a simple but important kind of task: select-
ing the most probable k of n events. The panel approaches this task in the
way set out in the introduction. A language of probability grades is fixed.
Each panel member assesses all the events and assigns to each one a prob-
ability grade. The different grades assigned to any given event by all the
panel members then determine its collective grade. The collective grades
amount to a collective (weak) ordering of the events. Finally, k events are
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chosen from the top of the collective ordering. The performance of the panel
is a matter of how likely it is to choose some k events that are in fact among
the most probable events.
To simulate a panel of this sort we need to fix some further assumptions.
First, the grades. We assume throughout that these are absolute. This
means that, once we have fixed an interpretation for some label, whether or
not it is correct to apply this label to any given item is independent of which
other items happen to be under consideration along with it.6 Absolute grad-
ing has certain advantages when working in groups. For one thing, it makes
it possible to divide up the task, letting some people work on some of the
items, others on others, because their results can simply be merged. Balinski
and Laraki (2011, p. 185) argue that absolute grades are needed when we
come to aggregate inputs from different voters in a political election.
Second, the events. We assume there are n = 100 of them, and that the
number to be selected, k, is 10. For simplicity we assume to begin with
that the distribution of their probabilities is approximately Gaussian, with a
mean of 50% and a standard deviation of 30%, and truncated to the prob-
ability scale. For now this assumption is part of our “base model” but we
relax it in the next section, where we consider a distribution derived from
real data.
Next, the panel members. We assume that they assign grades on the basis
of their (i) individual estimates of the probabilities of the events and their
(ii) individual interpretations of the grades, which specify in absolute terms
upper and lower thresholds for applicability. For example, a panel member
who understands the top label A (or ”likely”7) to mean at least 80% will
award an A to any event he estimates to have a probability greater than
80%. These assumptions are compatible with our stipulation that grades
are absolute. Different panel members can have different interpretations
6The alternative is relative grading, as for instance when each panel member first ranks
all of the events he’s been given to consider as best he can from most to least probable, then
assigns the top grade to the top 5%, say, the next grade to the next 10%, and so on down
the ranking.
7We use letter grades for convenience because the order is known to all.
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of the grade labels. That is semantic diversity. But once a label has been
interpreted as one or the other interval of probability — once it has come to
express a grade — its applicability to an event is determined entirely by the
probability of this event, and that is independent of whichever other events
happen also to be under consideration.
The estimates in (i) are assumed to be completely precise and some-
what noisy. Both assumptions contain idealizations. Concerning precision,
it would be quite unrealistic to suppose that people can actually produce
precise estimates when asked for them. That is not our assumption, though.
Rather, the individual precise estimates are theoretical entities of our model;
by analogy with the physical fiction of “center of mass,” we can think of
them as the locations of imprecise estimates. The noise in the precise esti-
mates is for each member of the simulated panel assumed to be Gaussian
with a mean of 0% and a standard deviation of 10% (i.e., 1/3 of the standard
deviation of the event distribution). Thus we assume in effect that all panel
members have the same level of expertise and that all are unbiased, in that
the expectation of their estimates of the risk of any given event is its true
risk.8
Consider the graders now as a collective—as the panel they together make
up. We assume that the collective assigns a grade to each event. The collec-
tive grade of an event is the median of the grades assigned to it by the indi-
vidual members of the panel.9 These collective grades determine a ranking
of all the events, and this is used to select 10 events in the following manner.
First, if there are not more than 10 events that receive the top grade then all
of these events are selected. Then, if by selecting in addition all events that
get the second-best grade not more than 10 events are selected, then all of
these are selected as well. This is repeated until more than 10 events would
be selected by selecting all events that got the next grade down. When that
8We set aside philosophical qualms about the notion of an event’s true risk.
9The median grade is just the middlemost one, when they’re all put in order from top
to bottom; the related notion of “splitting the difference,” introduced in section 2, plays
no further role here. With an even number of panel members, a random selection is made
from the two middlemost grades.
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happens, it means that there are ties. We select at random from the tied
events to make up the required 10.
We need some way of assessing the performances of our panel mem-
bers, both as individuals and as a collective. Since the grading task at hand
is to select the 10 most likely events, we measure individual performance
by the percentage of 10 most likely events that are selected in the manner
just described. The performance of the risk panel as a whole is measured
similarly.
We have explained the basics of the model: the nature of the events, ex-
perts, and risk panel. We now turn to the main focus of our study: the
different ways in which panel members can interpret the applicable grades,
and the consequences for their individual and collective performance. We
assume, now, that when the panel takes up its task, nothing whatsoever is
known about the distribution of the probabilities of the events under consid-
eration. For all anyone can tell there might be a lot of very probable events,
or a lot of very improbable ones, or any mixture of these. In keeping with
our assumption that grades are absolute, this has consequences for which in-
terpretations can be recommended. Since the 10 most probable events might
be at the upper end of the probability scale 0%–100%, or at the lower end,
or anywhere in between, the most suitable interpretations would appear to
be ones that spread out the thresholds between grades over the whole scale.
Accordingly three cases seem particularly relevant, which we call Symmetric
Consensus, Random Interpretations and Random Consensus. We explain them
in turn.
There is a Symmetric Consensus if all of the graders interpret the grades
in exactly the same way and it is this: the grades map on to the 0%–100%
probability scale in a symmetric fashion. For example, if the available grades
are A, B, C, D, and E then, in case of Symmetric Consensus, each grader
interprets E as 0% – 20%, D as 20% – 40%, C as 40% – 60%, B as 60% –
80% and A as 80% – 100%. Symmetric Consensus models the case in which
members of the group are successfully trained to the point that they have
one and the same rather special interpretation of the grading expressions,
15
while abstracting away the details of the training method used. Symmetric
Consensus might on occasion be achievable. In general, though, it must be
regarded as, at best, a regulative ideal: something to aim for even if it cannot
quite be achieved.
In case of Random Interpretations people’s interpretations of the grades
could be anything. In the simulation, each time the expert panel goes about
the task of grading some events, an interpretation of the applicable grades is
chosen at random for each panel member, independently for each one. With
five grades for instance an interpretation is generated by selecting some four
threshold points from the 0%–100% scale. This allows panel members some
pretty ”crazy” interpretations. For example, one possible interpretation is:
E: 0% – 2%, D: 2% – 4%, C: 4% – 55%, B: 55% – 57%, and A: 57% –
100%. Because the threshold points are generated according to uniform
distribution, though, on average they will be spread out uniformly across
the 0% – 100% scale. Random Interpretations models the case in which
there could be lot of semantic diversity within the group of experts while
abstracting away from the origin of this diversity: whether the differing
cultural backgrounds of members of the panel, their various ages and levels
of experience, or what have you.
Finally, there is a Random Consensus when all panel members have the
same interpretation of the grades but it could be anything: each time the
panel goes about its task a common interpretation is chosen at random, as
described above. Random Consensus models the case in which each mem-
ber of the panel starts off with their own interpretation; then, realizing they
might have different ones, and thinking that that must be bad, they have a
group discussion that results in their settling on a common interpretation. It
is well known that such group discussions can be flawed in all sorts of ways
(cf. Sunstein 2006). Presumably it won’t help our panel’s performance if one
dominant member convinces the others to adopt a badly skewed interpreta-
tion that, making many distinctions at the bottom of the scale but few at the
top, might not be so good for discriminating among the most likely events.
Random Consensus models the results of such discussions while abstracting
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Figure 2: The Basic Model. Points with connecting lines indicate mean per-
formances across simulation runs. Shaded regions depict 95% confidence
intervals about the means.
away the back and forth.
4 Simulation Results
With all of these details in place, we can now simulate this grading task to
see what happens in the three cases explained above. Note that we have not
fixed the number of grades the risk experts use, since we want to see what
happens when we vary this. Figure 2 shows performances of the different
risk panel collectives with from 2 to 10 grades (blue for the Symmetric Con-
sensus group, green for the Random Interpretation group, and red for the
Random Consensus group).
There are also plots for the performance of the average of the graders’
precise estimates (dark grey), and the average performance of the graders’
precise estimates (light grey). The performance of the average is a bench-
mark because averaging precise estimates is the classic ”wisdom of crowds”
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aggregation method (cf. Page 2008 and Lyon 2016). Notice that it forms an
upper bound to all the performance plots. This level of performance is an
ideal that groups can aspire to, even if they can only achieve it when pre-
cise quantitative information is available. The average performance of the
graders’ precise estimates represents what you should expect if you chose
an individual grader at random, somehow found out their precise estimates,
and used these to make the selection.
Random Consensus is clearly the worst of our three cases. Symmetric
Consensus and Random Interpretations both do systematically better and
have roughly the same performance levels. Notice that with 3 grades it
is best if the experts have interpretations chosen at random. With just 2
grades, both Random Interpretations and Random Consensus outperform
Symmetric Consensus.
These observations are surprising. It has seemed intuitively obvious that
interpersonal differences of interpretation must lower the quality of collec-
tive judgements, by creating equivocation and misunderstandings. The re-
sults also seem to be at odds with claims of Balinski and Laraki (2011) and
of Morreau (2016) about the importance of common languages and shared
interpretations. Here it seems we may expect almost identical performance
from one group that ’s completely “on the same page” and another whose
interpretations could be all over the placel!10 Soon we will illustrate the ro-
bustness of the results, by varying relevant parameters including the size of
the panel, the expertise of its members, and the distribution of event proba-
bilities. First, though, let’s try to understand why some of the results are as
they are. We do not now have full explanations but can suggest where these
will be found.
Grading languages like the ones studied here, with from just 2 to 10
terms, don’t make many distinctions. Their expressive resources are stretched
in this task, with 100 events to distinguish between. Allowing different peo-
10With random interpretations there is no interpersonal constraint on interpretations. The
only real requirement is that each individual’s interpretation is coherent, in the sense that
higher grades go with higher probability intervals.
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ple to have different interpretations of the same terms, though, will tend to
increase the total number of distinctions drawn by different members of the
group. Somehow the aggregation procedure exploits these differences so as
to arrive at a finer-grained ranking of the 100 items than is possible with a
consensus interpretation.
The generally poor performance of Random Consensus in comparison
with Symmetric Consensus is, we think, a result of differences in the suit-
ability, for the panel’s particular task, of different interpretations of grading
languages. The symmetric interpretation, we suggest, is one of those that
tends to give pretty good epistemic performance, even if it is not optimal.
There are many other interpretations, some of which don’t make distinc-
tions where these are needed. The result in Figure 2 suggests to us that the
symmetric interpretation is better than most of these alternatives.
Why does Random Interpretations show better performance when there
are 3 grades? And why does Random Consensus do relatively well when
there are just 2? Apparently, when the number of grades is very small in
relation to the number of items to choose among, fixing a common inter-
pretation once and for all severely depresses collective performance. Ran-
domizing interpretations gives different members different interpretations
“at the same time”—which is to say on any given run of the simulation or,
intuitively speaking, on any given occasion on which the panel performs its
task. Random Consensus forces a common interpretation at any given time,
but the group settles on different ones on different occasions; sometimes, at
least, the common interpretation will be one that makes a distinction where
that is needed, among the most probable events. With just 2 grades, on
the other hand, the symmetric interpretation makes no distinctions at all
above 50%; since about half of the 100 events are more probable than that,
the result is very poor performance from the Symmetric Consensus panel.
Apparently, with a very small number of grades the differences of interpre-
tation that come with Random Interpretations and Random Consensus are
enough to bring performance above the very low level obtained with the
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Symmetric Consensus.11
Another interesting point we note, this time without explanation, is that
the epistemic advantage in using more grades diminishes rapidly above
about 5 grades.
Our findings are robust under a range changes of parameters in the simu-
lation that correspond to differences among real panels of experts. One such
change is to increase the noise in the panel members’ estimations. Noisier
estimations may be expected, for instance, from panel members with less
individual expertise, or who must work more quickly or with poorer in-
formation. We model increased noise by increasing the standard deviation
of the panel members’ estimation process. The qualitatively similar results
then obtained are illustrated in Figure 3. As the experts get noisier, the
performance of the average of their estimates decreases and this acts as an
upper bound on the performances of the collective grades.
What happens if we change the size of the panel? Not much. If we
decrease the number of graders the performances of the collective selections
(including the ones based on the precise estimates) all decrease slightly. With
more graders the exact opposite happens. This is to be expected: with a
smaller group there’s less scope for collective wisdom.12
So far we have been varying the basic parameters of the model (except for
the event probability-distribution parameters). Before varying some struc-
tural assumptions we highlight an interesting feature of all results so far: it’s
hard to do much better than 5 grades under Random Interpretations. This
can have important practical consequences. Our results suggest that if you
want to set up a fairly good panel at minimal expense, use about 5 grades
11Luc Bovens (private communication) reports an analysis of binary grading that sup-
ports our observation that Random Consensus outperforms Symmetric Consensus in this
case. His results suggest that things will be the same with a uniform distribution of the
probabilities of the 100 events, instead of the Gaussian of Figure 2, but that when many
more events than 10 are to be selected the Symmetric Consensus will be better. Analyses of
this sort are valuable. They help to explain the results and can suggest new hypotheses to
test in further simulations.
12We omit graphs for these results to save space.
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Figure 3: The basic model again, but the graders have less expertise.
and let panel members understand them however they like (assuming you
expect their interpretations to vary a lot). You won’t need a very large panel,
either: 5 to 10 members will do nicely.
These recommendations should, of course, be taken with care—if they
are taken at all—since they rest on assumptions that will sometimes not be
found realistic. For example, we assume that the number of available grades
has no bearing on the quality of the experts’ judgement. One might expect,
though, that having to choose among a large number of grades places a cog-
nitive burden on the experts, so let’s see what happens when this decreases
the accuracy of their estimates. Figure 4 concerns the case in which the noise
of the experts is 5n, where n is the number of grades; so if there are just 2
grades to choose between the standard deviation of the estimates is 10%;
with 10 grades it is 50%. Interestingly, the results are quite similar to those
obtained with the basic model. The picture is much the same if the cognitive
burden is assumed even greater (e.g., instead of 5n we use 10n).
The trade-off between the number of grades and estimate accuracy might
sometimes go in the other direction instead. That could happen if the
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Figure 4: The basic model with a trade-off between the experts’ level of
expertise and the number of grades: the standard deviation of the experts’
estimation process is 5n, where n is the number of grades.
graders, knowing they can only use a small number of grades, put less
effort into coming up with accurate precise estimates of the event probabili-
ties. Conversely, if they know they are expected to use a lot of grades, then
they might try harder. The results of these sorts of simulations are not all
that interesting. To get anything remotely interesting, we need to assume
that there is a lot of noise (i.e., std ≈ 50%) when the experts use 2 grades
and that it approaches 0 as we increase the number of grades. This has the
qualitative effect of increasing the slope of all the curves above those of the
base model.
An important assumption so far is that the distribution of event proba-
bilities is Gaussian, with a mean of 50% and a standard deviation of 30%.
What if most of the events are very likely? Changing the mean of the Gaus-
sian to 80% (and keeping it truncated at 100%) we see similar results, except
that now performance is not as good and improves comparatively slowly as
the number of grades increases. Symmetric Consensus, Random Interpreta-
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Figure 5: The basic model but with mean event probability set to 80%.
tions and Random Consensus perform similarly, and comparatively poorly,
over the whole range of grades (see Figure 5). With a more extreme change,
shifting the mean to 90%, say, and shrinking the standard deviation down to
10% (from 30%), we get comparable results. Apparently, when most events
are very likely the panel’s choice procedure is overwhelmed. It is not ca-
pable of making enough distinctions to separate the most likely of all from
the rest, whether panel members share a common interpretation or not, and
especially when the number of available grades is small.
Moving things in the other direction, say by setting the mean to 20%
(while keeping the standard deviation at 30%), the picture is much as it is
with the original model. The results are more volatile, though, since the
collective grading task is to choose the 10 most likely events and they are all
in the long tail of the distribution.13
We also derived a real distribution of event risks from the Intelligence
Game risk analysis experiment, Wintle et al. 2012. The Intelligence Game
13Following up on one reviewer’s suggestion we repeated the simulations using beta
distributions instead of truncated Gaussians but found no discernible change in the results.
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project involved hundreds of participants forecasting geopolitical events us-
ing subjective probabilities. To estimate a ”true risk” for each event, we
took the average of the probabilities assigned to it by the 100 best calibrated
participants in the experiment.14 By focusing on the best calibrated partic-
ipants (measured across all of the events that were forecasted), it is hoped
that we measured some stable probabilistic feature of the events in question.
By looking at this distribution, we found it to be approximately a Pareto
distribution, a distribution that commonly appears in nature (see figure 6).
We were also able to calculate the average noise of the participants about
these ”true risks”, assuming it to be Gaussian with a fixed variance: 12.28%
probability. Using these as inputs to the simulation model, we found similar
results (see figure 6), except that in this case the Symmetric Consensus al-
ways did as well as or better than the Random Interpretations (on average).
We’ve by no means exhausted modifications of the basic model. How-
ever, we think the main result of the simulation model has become clear:
under a wide range of conditions, an expert panel may be expected to per-
form almost as well when the different experts on the panel have different
interpretations of the available grades, chosen at random, as when they all
share one and the same symmetric interpretation. If on the other hand the
experts share a common interpretation, but it is any old one, chosen at ran-
dom, collective performance tends to be quite a bit worse.
There is an important lesson here. Training, discussion and other efforts
to improve group performance by standardizing everybody’s understanding
of evaluative language are not always good. They can be counterproductive
if the result is convergence on an interpretation that is not itself especially
good. That could happen, say, if the experts in the panel start off with a
wide range of interpretations and, perhaps as a result of group discussion,
the panel can settle on any one of those.
14Someone is well calibrated to the extent that their confidence in their predictions agrees
with how many of these come true: of the predictions in which they’re 90% confident about
90% should come true, and so on.
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Figure 6: The basic model but with the distribution of events and expert
noise derived from the Intelligence Game risk analysis experiment, Wintle
et al. 2012.
5 Summary
Committees and expert panels commonly rank items of various kinds on
the basis of scores or grades contributed by individual members. People
interpret scores and grades differently, though, and this might be expected
to reduce the group’s capacity to track the facts on which good decision
making depends. This article investigates the consequences of diversity in
grading thresholds for a group’s capacity, in particular, to rank events by
their probability and choose the most probable ones. It approaches this
matter using the methodology of multi-agent computer modeling.
The main finding is that having members with different grading thresh-
olds can boost the epistemic performance of a group. It does so under a
range of realistic assumptions about the number of members, levels of their
individual expertise, and distributions of the items under consideration. We
note that we have tested our finding, though, only for the case in which
grades are given absolute interpretations, and using grading languages that
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appear suitable for the case in which nothing is known in advance about the
actual distribution of the events under consideration. While we have no spe-
cial reason to expect that matters are different with relative grades, or with
advance knowledge of distributions, further simulation work is needed to
establish that diversity in thresholds boosts epistemic performance in these
cases as well.
Our conclusions might be found surprising. Differing interpretations of
scores and grades amount after all to a kind of equivocation, and that is
something it seems better to avoid when working in groups. We do not
offer a full explanation for our main finding but point in the direction in
which we expect that one will be found. It is inherent in scoring and grad-
ing that relevantly different cases sometimes get lumped together. When a
group can make any distinctions that its individual members do, though,
a group whose members have different thresholds makes more distinctions
than does a group with the same thresholds, and it is able to tell more differ-
ent cases apart. This, we suggest, is how diversity of thresholds contributes
to the performance of groups in ranking tasks.
Our results so far come from observing simulated groups only. Further
empirical work is needed to see whether they hold up for real juries, com-
mittees and expert panels.
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